

didates whose sectional prejudices are strongest, will, on that account be preferred. And hence the Convention will be composed of the most angry and discordant materials : in which one section of the State will be arrayed in hostility against another. Will gentlemen from the East and Cape-Fear consent to create such a body, and place our civil institutions at its mercy ?—Will they place themselves and their constituents at the mercy of the West, under the influence of the strongest sectional prejudices, without the least power of self protection ?

Suppose however, the Convention when assembled, should regard the restrictions imposed or recommended by the Legislature, as binding : and should confine themselves to the adoption or rejection of the articles proposed by the Resolutions : are they such, that their adoption would justify the least risk or trouble and expense ? If they could be incorporated into our Constitution without endangering, in the least, that political influence, now held by the section of the State to which I belong. I would oppose most of them, and others I would not care to adopt. I look upon some of them as likely to prove pernicious in their effects. I allude to those which propose, that the election of members of the Assembly, and the sessions of the Legislature, shall be biennially, instead of annually, as at present. The only argument which has been urged in favor of this proposed change is, that it would occasion a saving to the Government, according to one gentleman, of twenty thousand dollars, according to another of forty thousand. Now, if the Legislature, when it assembles but once in two years, should sit no longer than it does at present, the argument would be correct. But is it not likely, that if it should assemble but once in two years, there would be such an accumulation of business, that the sessions instead of being eight weeks, would be double that time ? If so, nothing would be gained in point of economy, simply from that alteration.

But, sir, there are evils to be apprehended from this proposed change. The powers of Government are derived from the people, and they who are intrusted with them, are responsible for the faithful exercise of them, and cannot therefore, too sensibly feel their dependence upon the source from whence those powers are derived. When this dependence is properly felt, the will of the people will be studiously consulted ; it will be stamped upon the measures of government, and will infuse itself into the policy, to be pursued. Now in proportion as you render elections less frequent, you destroy this dependence. At present, does not every member upon this floor know, that if he disregards the known will of his constituents, he will endanger his re-election—that he will be before the people again, before the feelings which his inatten-